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Chapter 4: Patients, physicians and law at the end of life in England and Wales 
Isra Black 
1. Introduction 
This contribution has two objectives. The first is descriptive: I provide a brief account of the legal status of a 
variety of end of life decisions or interventions in England and Wales, including refusal of life-prolonging 
medical treatment, stopping of eating and drinking (SED), withdrawal or withholding of life-prolonging 
treatment, euthanasia and assisted suicide. To help set the law in a clinical context, I have included a series 
of hypothetical cases that a cancer specialist might find challenging if encountered in real life. The second 
objective is more critical: I consider the legal basis for medicine in England and Wales and attempt to 
identify the grounds on which physician-assisted death might be argued to be lawful or unlawful compared 
with other medical interventions. 
Four preliminaries: (1) I make no claims as to the applicability of what I say to jurisdictions within the UK 
other than England and Wales; (2) for brevity, I shall discuss only the law as it applies to individuals aged 
18 years and over; (3) again for brevity, I omit discussion of the conferral of lasting powers of attorney; (4) 
readers should note that by physician-assisted death I mean physician-administered voluntary euthanasia, or 
physician-assisted suicide. I shall distinguish the former from other kinds of euthanasia in due course. 
2. End of life decisions and interventions and English law 
I shall first outline English law as it relates to refusal of life-prolonging treatment, SED, and withdrawal or 
withholding of life-prolonging treatment. These end of life decisions share common ground, insofar as they 
involve some combination of a physician offering or not offering medical treatment and a patient consenting 
to or refusing treatment or being unable to consent or to refuse. I shall then summarize English law on 
euthanasia and the encouraging or assisting of suicide. 
2.1. Refusal of life-prolonging treatment 
Here our concern is the legal status of the conduct by which a patient declines an intervention offered by a 
medical professional. A contemporaneous refusal of treatment (or indeed a contemporaneous consent to 
treatment) is legally valid if the following criteria are met: (1) WKHSK\VLFLDQKDVLQIRUPHGWKHSDWLHQWµLQ
EURDGWHUPVRIWKHQDWXUHRIWKHSURFHGXUH¶1 (2) the patient has decision-making capacity, which is governed 
by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005), sections 1±3; and (3) the SDWLHQW¶VGHFLVLRQLVYROXQWDU\.2 If a 
SDWLHQW¶VUHIXVDORIWUHDWPHQWODFNVYDOLGLW\LWPD\EHODZIXOWRSURYLGHWUHDWPHQWSURYLGHGWKDWWKH
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physician has taken reasonable steps to establish whether the patient lacks capacity, that the physician 
reasonably believes that the patient lacks capacity, and that the physician reasonably believes that the 
WUHDWPHQWLVLQWKHSDWLHQW¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWV (MCA 2005, sections 5 and 4). 
It is incontrovertible that unless an adult is subject to compulsory treatment under the Mental Health Act 
1983, her valid refusal of medical treatment is legally effective. Put another way, the general rule is that 
overriding a valid refusal of treatment is unlawful, that is, it is a civil wrong (tort) or a crime;3 the common 
law (the body of law expounded by judges) takes the prima facie inviolability of the person as a fundamental 
principle.4 Treatment over a valid refusal is also likely, in the case of physicians engaged in NHS activity, to 
amount to an unlawful infringement of personal autonomy, which is an aspect of the right to private life 
protected by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA 1998), sections 6 and 7).5 Box 4.1 provides a worked example in respect of (contemporaneous) 
refusal of life-prolonging treatment. 
An advance decision to refuse treatment is a decision taken by a person who has decision-making capacity 
to refuse medical treatment in a future situation in which: (1) she lacks capacity; and (2) a physician wishes 
to provide the unwanted treatment. The MCA 2005 governs advance decisions to refuse treatment. A key 
SULQFLSOHRIWKH$FWLVWKDWµDSHUVRQPXVWEHDVVXPHGWRKDYHFDSDFLW\XQOess it is established that he lacks 
FDSDFLW\¶ (MCA 2005, section 1(2)). This principle applies as much to advance decisions as it does to 
contemporaneous refusals of treatment. 
A valid and applicable advance decision to refuse treatment has identical legal effect to a valid 
contemporaneous refusal of treatment (MCA 2005, section 26(1)). Overriding a valid and applicable 
advance refusal of treatment is unlawful, that is, it amounts to a tort or a crime. In order for an advance 
decision to refuse treatment to be valid, an individual must not: (1) have withdrawn their decision (MCA 
2005, section 25(2)(a); section 24 sets out the modalities for withdrawal (and alteration)); (2) have created a 
lasting power of attorney after the advance decision was made that covers the same subject matter (MCA 
2005, section 25(2)(b)). For example, if a person makes an advance decision to refuse cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation and later makes express provision for the donee of her lasting power of attorney to take all 
decisions in respect of life-prolonging treatment, the advance decision ceases to be valid; and (3) have done 
µDQ\WKLQJHOVHclearly inconsistent with the advance decision UHPDLQLQJKLVIL[HGGHFLVLRQ¶(MCA 2005, 
section 25(2)(c)). :KHWKHUDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHKDYLRXUDPRXQWVWRFOHDULQFRQVLVWHQF\UHTXLUHVWKHH[HUFLVHRI
MXGJHPHQW$JRRGH[DPSOHPLJKWEHDPHPEHURIWKH-HKRYDK¶V:LWQHVVUHOLJLRQPDNLQJDQDGYDQFH
decision to refuse specific blood products but later renouncing her faith. 
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A number of factors are relevant to whether an advance decision to refuse treatment is applicable. First, an 
advance decision is not applicable if an individual is able contemporaneously to consent to or refuse 
treatment (MCA 2005, section 25(3)). Second, the treatment refused must be the treatment offered and the 
circumstances in which the treatment is refused must be the circumstances in which the treatment is offered 
(MCA 2005, section 25(4)(a) and (b)))RUH[DPSOHLIDSHUVRQ¶VDGYDQFHGHFLVLRQrefuses cardiopulmonary 
UHVXVFLWDWLRQEXWVXUJHU\LVRQRIIHUWKHDGYDQFHGHFLVLRQLVQRWDSSOLFDEOH$QGLIDSHUVRQ¶VDGYDQFH
decision refuses a blood transfusion in the event that she has dementia, but she has no ongoing neurological 
disorder and has been involved in a road traffic collision, the advance decision is not applicable. It is 
important to note that the treatment refused and the circumstances in which the treatment is refused may be 
specified in lay terms (MCA 2005, section 24(2)). Third, an DGYDQFHGHFLVLRQLVQRWDSSOLFDEOHLIµWKHUHDUH
reasonable grounds for believing that circumstances exist that P [the patient] did not anticipate at the time of 
the advance decision and that ZRXOGKDYHDIIHFWHGKLVGHFLVLRQKDGKHDQWLFLSDWHGWKHP¶(MCA 2005, 
section 25(4)(c)). Perhaps a classic example of unanticipated circumstances is unforeseen developments in 
medical treatment (MCA 2005, Code of Practice, paragraph 9.43).6 Thus if a person refuses what they 
expect to be very burdensome treatment, but developments in technology have changed the benefit±burden 
profile, an advance decision may not be applicable. Finally, an advance decision is not applicable to life-
prolonging treatment unless certain conditions are met. The individual must state in her advance decision 
that she refuses treatment even if her life is at risk (MCA 2005, section 25(5)(a)). And her advance decision 
must be: (1) in writing; (2) signed by her (or by another person in her presence and acting at her direction); 
(3) witnessed by a third party ± QRWWKHVDPHSHUVRQZKRVLJQVDWWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VGLUHFWLRQDQG(4) signed 
E\WKHZLWQHVVLQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSUHVHQFH 
Box 4.1 Refusal of life-prolonging treatment. 
A 45-year-old woman with breast cancer metastatic to lymph nodes, bone and liver was treated with 
combination chemotherapy. Initially, she responded well to treatment and obtained a partial remission 
with good quality of life. This was sustained for 15 months, when she began to develop new symptoms 
suggestive of recurrence. Reassessment investigations confirmed that she had relapsed at all of the known 
sites of her disease. Her oncologist offered her a second-line combination chemotherapy, indicating that 
there was still a good chance that it would reduce the volume of her metastatic disease, improve her 
symptoms and prolong her life by a few months. They discussed the experience of treatment, the schedule 
and time commitment required, and the potential for toxicity, including the risks of major toxicity or 
treatment-related death. 
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The patient decided to decline second-line chemotherapy and asked that, as has already been considered, 
she be referred to the palliative care team for symptom control and appropriate end of life care. Her 
decision was motivated by her wish to spend as much time with her young family as possible. This would 
be achieved by avoiding hospital trips and the risk of hospitalization. 
Is the oncologist obliged to accept a SDWLHQW¶VGHFLVLRQWRGHFOLQHDWUHDWPHQWWKDWKDVDJRRGFKDQFH
of prolonging life? 
7KHFOLQLFLDQPXVWVDWLVI\KHUVHOIWKDWWKHSDWLHQW¶VGHFLVLRQLVOHJDOO\YDOLG6KHKDVH[SODLQHGLQEURDG
terms the nature of the procedure. The patient is presumed to possess capacity and appears able both to 
receive the information and process it, and to express her views clearly. There is no evidence that the 
decision has not been taken voluntarily. As the legal criteria appear to have been met, WKHSDWLHQW¶V
decision is legally valid and must be respected. The oncologist and members of the wider 
multidisciplinary team should support her in her decision. 
 
2.2. Stopping of eating and drinking 
Although not inherently a medical decision, the pursuit of SED may bring the patient into contact with 
medical professionals. A patient may decide to refrain from oral ingestion of food and fluids, which is met 
by an offer to provide clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH) on the part of her physician (or 
indeed consideration of involuntary feeding by the latter). Or a patient may be in receipt of CANH but wish 
to refuse it henceforth. Or a patient may wish to receive palliative care, for example, analgesic, antipsychotic 
or sedative drugs, to improve her dying process.7 From either of the first two examples the parallel between 
SED and refusal of treatment emerges: the offer (or contemplation) of medical intervention is met by patient 
refusal. If an SED decision of this kind is legally valid (the validity criteria are the same as above), it is 
legally effective in the same way as a refusal of treatment. It is unlawful to feed a patient validly embarking 
on SED, against her will.8 
The legal status of support for SED in England and Wales is uncomplicated: it is lawful. The law denies that 
refusal of life-prolonging treatment ever amounts to suicide.9 A decision to pursue SED in the presence of an 
offer to provide CANH is a refusal of treatment. In law, such a decision does not constitute suicide. Support 
for SED cannot amount to suicide assistance, legally speaking. Box 4.2 provides a worked example in 
respect of SED. 
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Box 4.2 Stopping of eating and drinking. 
A 67-year-old man was initially diagnosed with locally advanced colon cancer treated by surgery and 
chemotherapy. He remained well for 15 months, when routine follow-up investigations revealed abnormal 
liver function tests and imaging revealed liver metastases. He was treated with second-line chemotherapy, 
followed by the resection of liver metastases. At the end of the procedure he was disease-free on all 
investigations. A year later the disease returned in the liver and he was treated again with second-line 
chemotherapy, but surgery was not considered feasible. He experienced considerable toxicity and, after a 
brief partial regression of his disease, it progressed steadily, producing bulky metastases with associated 
pain, jaundice and persistent nausea. He became seriously unwell and expressed a wish to have no further 
active treatment. He discussed the option of further chemotherapy with his oncologist and in a shared 
decision they agreed that further systemic anticancer treatment was likely to be of very limited benefit. 
7KHSDWLHQW¶VV\PSWRPVSURJUHVVHGDQGKHGHFided that he wished to die. He discussed his decision with 
his family and clinical team. Following the discussion he decided to stop eating and drinking but asked 
that the clinical team should undertake all measures to keep him as comfortable as possible. The 
consultant suggested that the patient would be more comfortable if he received intravenous fluids but the 
patient did not wish to do so. 
Is the consultant permitted to administer intravenous fluids? 
Are the team permitted to provide symptom control and supportive care through the period during 
which the patient declines to eat and drink? 
The patient understands the situation and has had the options around systemic anticancer therapy and 
intravenous hydration explained but declines them. He is presumed to have capacity and there is no 
evidence to rebut this presumption: he appears able to receive the relevant information, process it and 
express his views clearly. Similarly, there is no evidence of a lack of voluntariness. The clinical team are 
therefore not permitted to administer intravenous fluids. They are, however, permitted to provide 
symptom control until the patient dies or withdraws his decision to refuse nutrition and hydration. 
 
2.3. Withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging treatment 
Two important common law principles structure the legal regime for withholding or withdrawing life-
SURORQJLQJWUHDWPHQW)LUVWDSK\VLFLDQRZHVKHUSDWLHQWDFRPPRQODZGXW\RIFDUHµWRWDNe reasonable 
VWHSVWRNHHS>KHU@DOLYH¶(R (Burke) v General Medical Council, paragraph 32).10 Second, a court will not 
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order a doctor to treat contrary to her clinical judgement.10,11 It is helpful to treat separately patients who 
possess decision-making capacity and patients for whom capacity is absent, either on a temporary or a 
permanent basis, when examining the application of these principles. 
In respect of patients who possess decision-making capacity, a valid refusal of treatment extinguishes the 
SK\VLFLDQ¶VGXW\RIFDUHLQUHVSHFWRIWKHWUHDWPHQWRIIHUHGWKHSK\VLFLDQKDVQRGXW\WRSURYLGHVDLG
treatment. Indeed, as noted above, it would be unlawful at common law to force treatment. In situations in 
which a patient possesses decision-making capacity and wishes to receive life-prolonging treatment, the 
courts have ruled that a failure to take reasonable steps to keep the patient alive would leave a physician 
open to a charge of murder (R (Burke) v General Medical Council, paragraph 34).10 This may appear to sit 
uneasily with the principle that a court will not order a physician to treat contrary to her clinical judgement. 
In fact, it is perfectly consistent. The civil courts will not order a physician to provide treatment. But she 
may be open to criminal prosecution should she refuse to treat a patient with capacity who wishes to be kept 
alive. Box 4.3 provides a worked example in respect of withdrawal of treatment in circumstances in which 
an individual has decision-making capacity. 
Box 4.3 Withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging treatment. 
A 69-year-old woman was diagnosed with stage 4 non-Hodgkin lymphoma and treated initially with 
combination chemotherapy. She entered a complete remission. This was maintained for 3 years, when her 
disease relapsed with rapidly progressive lymphadenopathy and hepatosplenomegaly. Her haemato-
oncologist recommended second-line combination chemotherapy and discussed the procedure with her 
carefully, including the risks of toxicity and the schedule of hospital visits involved. The patient was the 
principal carer for her husband who was suffering from advanced dementia. She felt that if she spent time 
away from him it would cause him great distress. She declined chemotherapy and asked for an active 
programme of symptom control and support at home. 
The haemato-RQFRORJLVWZDVJUHDWO\FRQFHUQHGE\WKHSDWLHQW¶VUHIXVDORIDWUHDWPHQWWKDWKHFRQVLGHUHG
would bring her considerable benefit. He felt that he would be failing in his duty of care were he not to 
deliver the chemotherapy. He sought legal advice from his NHS trust. 
What is the legal advice? 
The legal advice states in the event that the patient fulfils the criteria for a valid refusal of treatment. Her 
refusal of treatment relieves the physician of his duty of care to prolong her life by providing 
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chemotherapy. He may continue to provide her with general medical care and involve other professionals 
as necessary to ensure symptom control and end of life care when appropriate. 
 
Concerning patients who lack decision-PDNLQJFDSDFLW\WKHSK\VLFLDQ¶VOHJDOGXW\WRWDNHUHDVRQDEOHVWHSV
to keep her patient alive is conditioned by the requirement that treatment for an individual who lacks 
capacity will RQO\EHODZIXOLILWLVLQDSDWLHQW¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWVMCA 2005, sections 5 and 4). When 
FRQVLGHULQJEHVWLQWHUHVWVWKHOHJDOTXHVWLRQLVµZKHWKHULWLVLQWKHSDWLHQW
VEHVWLQWHUHVWVWRJLYHWKH
treatment, rather than «ZKHWKHULWLVLQKLVEHVWLQWHUHVWVWRZLWKKROGRUZLWKGUDZLW¶(Aintree University 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James, paragraph 22).12 7KLVLVEHFDXVHWKHODZ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWR
inviolability of the person applies as much to individuals who lack capacity as it does to individuals who 
possess capacity;13 that is, there will be circumstances in which withdrawal or withholding of treatment is 
UHTXLUHGEHFDXVHLWVSURYLVLRQLVQRWLQWKHSDWLHQW¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWV)RUH[DPSOHWUHDWPHQWPD\QRWEHLQDQ
LQGLYLGXDO¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWVZKHQLWLQYROYHVDQµH[WUHPHGHJUHHRISDLQGLVFRPIRUWRULQGLJQLW\¶(R (Burke) v 
General Medical Council, paragraph 33),10 or when an individual is in a permanent or minimally conscious 
state.9,14 In all cases, physicians tasked with ascertaining the best interests of an individual who lacks 
FDSDFLW\PXVWµORRNDWKLVZHOIDUHLQWKHZLGHVWVHQVH, not just medical but social and psychological «>WKH\
must] put themselves in the place of the individual patient and ask what his attitude to the treatment was or 
ZRXOGEHOLNHO\WREH¶Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James, paragraph 39).12 
Approaching best interests from a patient-centred and welfare-driven perspective may mean that physicians 
become legally required to discontinue treatment, contrary to their clinical judgement. It does not entail, 
however, that physicians are required to treat patients when treatment runs contrary to their clinical 
judgement (R (Burke) v General Medical Council, paragraph 31),10 subject to the requirement that the 
exercise of professional discretion is reasonable (Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v 
James, paragraph 22).12,15 Again, no court will order a physician to provide treatment contrary to her clinical 
MXGJHPHQW0RUHRYHUQRFRXUWZLOOKROGWKDWDQLQWHUYHQWLRQLVLQDSDWLHQW¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWVLIWKHUHLVQR
SK\VLFLDQZKRLVµUHDG\ZLOOLQJDQGDEOH¶WRSURYLGHWUHDWPHnt; speculative applications to the court for 
determination of best interests will be struck out for abuse of process.16 
2.4. Euthanasia 
(XWKDQDVLDLQYROYHVDSHUVRQ'GHOLEHUDWHO\FDXVLQJWKHGHDWKRIDQRWKHU3IRU3¶VRZQJRRG$FODVVLF
example of euthanasia relevant to our discussion involves a physician deliberately injecting her patient with 
lethal medication because it is better or best for the latter. We may further describe euthanasia as voluntary, 
non-voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary euthanasia LQYROYHV'FDXVLQJ3¶VGHDWKIRU3¶VRZQJRRGZKHQ3
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KDVFRQVHQWHGWR'¶VFRQGXFW1RQ-YROXQWDU\HXWKDQDVLDLQYROYHV'FDXVLQJ3¶VGHDWKIRU3¶VRZQJRRG
ZKHQ3ODFNVFDSDFLW\WRFRQVHQWWR'¶VFRQGXFW,QYROXQWDU\HXWKDQDVLDLQYROYHV'FDXVLQJ3¶VGHath, for 
3¶VRZQJRRG ZKHQ3KDVUHIXVHG'¶VFRQGXFW(that is, GHDWKLVLPSRVHGDJDLQVW3¶VZLOO). Only voluntary 
euthanasia performed by a physician falls within the rubric of physician-assisted death. 
All forms of euthanasia are illegal (that is, constitute murder) in English law (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, 
page 865).9 The offence is made out regardless of whether the person who dies consented to the conduct 
causing her death, or that death was better or best for her; that is, consent is no defence to murder and there 
is no distinction between euthanasia and less beneficent killing. Box 4.4 provides a worked example in 
respect of voluntary euthanasia. 
Box 4.4 Euthanasia 
An 89-year-old man had advanced unresectable recurrent rectal cancer that was producing obstruction at 
the rectosigmoid junction. He had delayed attending for medical care and the complications progressed to 
include a perforation producing intractable peritonitis and persistent difficulty to control pain. He was 
treated with antibiotics and intravenous hydration, but a surgical consultant confirmed that no operation 
could prevent the leakage of bowel contents into the peritoneal cavity. 
The patient understood the situation and considered all the procedures that were options for him. He was 
particularly distressed by the loss of dignity experienced in association with his extensive intra-abdominal 
complications. He asked a member of the clinical team if it was possible to have euthanasia. 
Are the clinical team permitted to provide euthanasia? 
Euthanasia is unlawful in all jurisdictions within the UK. The clinical team are not permitted to provide 
euthanasia. 
 
2.5. Assisted suicide 
Suicide ceased to be a crime upon the enactment of the Suicide Act 1961, section 1. However, the Suicide 
Act 1961, section 2(1), PDNHVHQFRXUDJLQJRUDVVLVWLQJVXLFLGHDFULPH8QGHUWKH$FWµ³D´) commits an 
offence if (a) D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another 
SHUVRQDQGE'
VDFWZDVLQWHQGHGWRHQFRXUDJHRUDVVLVWVXLFLGHRUDQDWWHPSWDWVXLFLGH¶$QH[DPSOHRI
physician-assisted suicide that would fall within the scope of the offence is the prescription by a physician of 
a lethal dose of barbiturates to her patient, which the latter self-administers. 
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The consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is required for any prosecution for encouraging or 
assisting suicide (Suicide Act 1961, section 2(4)). In exercising the discretion, the DPP applies the two-stage 
test contained in the Code for Crown Prosecutors,17 supplemented by an offence-specific policy on 
encouraging or assisting suicide.18 7KHILUVWVWDJHRIWKHWHVWUHTXLUHVSURVHFXWRUVWRFRQVLGHUZKHWKHUµWKHUH
is sufficiHQWHYLGHQFHWRSURYLGHDUHDOLVWLFSURVSHFWRIFRQYLFWLRQ¶Code for Crown Prosecutors, paragraph 
4.6).17 If this stage is passed (a case cannot otherwise proceed), the prosecutor must consider whether 
criminal proceedings are in the public interest. Here, the policy on encouraging or assisting suicide becomes 
relevant. The policy enumerates a number of factors that tend in favour and that tend against prosecution. 
7KHVHIDFWRUVSULQFLSDOO\FRQFHUQWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIZKHWKHUDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VGHFLVLRQWRSerform suicide is 
autonomous.19 )RUH[DPSOHIDFWRUWHQGLQJLQIDYRXURISURVHFXWLRQUHDGVµWKHYLFWLPKDGQRWUHDFKHGD
YROXQWDU\FOHDUVHWWOHGDQGLQIRUPHGGHFLVLRQ¶ZKLOHIDFWRUWHQGLQJDJDLQVWSURVHFXWLRQUHDGVµWKH
actions of the suspect may be characterized as reluctant encouragement or assistance in the face of a 
GHWHUPLQHGZLVKRQWKHSDUWRIWKHYLFWLP¶18 
In respect of physician-assisted suicide, health professional status is a factor that tends in favour of 
prosecution, albeit not in and of itself. Factor 14 of the policy on encouraging or assisting suicide states that 
prosecution is more likely if µthe suspect was acting in his or her capacity as a medical doctor, nurse, other 
healthcare professional, a professional carer [whether for payment or not] «DQGWKHYLFWLPZDVLQKLVRUKHU
care¶.18 
Factor 14 includes the following clarificatory footnote: µthe words ³and the victim was in his or her care´ 
TXDOLI\DOORIWKHSUHFHGLQJSDUWVRIWKLVSDUDJUDSK«7KLVIDFWRUGRHVQRWDSSO\PHUHO\EHFDXVHVRPHRQH
was acting in a capacity described within it: it applies only where there was, in addition, a relationship of 
care between the suspect and the victims [sic] such that it will be necessary to consider whether the suspect 
may have exerted some influence on the victim.¶18 
$JDLQZHFDQVHHWKDWWKHLVVXHLVZKHWKHUWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VVXLFLGHLVDXWRQRPRXV, or whether the 
SURIHVVLRQDO¶VLQIOXHQFHLVVXFKWKDWWKHUHZRXOGEHZRUULHVWKDWWKHGHFHDVHG¶VGHFLVLRQZDVQRWYROXQWDU\; 
that is, it is not professional status alone that is a factor that tends in favour of prosecution for the Suicide 
Act 1961, section 2, offence. Rather, it is professional status in conjunction with a relationship of care. 
However, to the extent that it is potentially difficult to conceive of circumstances in which a physician 
provides medical suicide assistance in the absence of a relationship of care, it may be difficult to avoid 
investigation into the degree of influence exerted on the deceased. For example, it seems plausible that if a 
physician prescribes medication knowing that an individual will stockpile it and attempt suicide, she does so 
within the context of a duty of care owed to the patient. 
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Before moving on, we should note the successive stream of litigation seeking to effect permissive legal 
change on assisted death since the entry into force of the HRA 1998 in October 2000. The offence-specific 
prosecutorial policy on encouraging and assisting suicide owes its existence to the decision in R (Purdy) v 
DPP,20 in which the House of Lords held that the Code for Crown Prosecutors failed to provide sufficient 
FODULW\DVWRWKH'33¶VH[HUFLVHRIGLVFUHWLRQWRSURVHFXWHXQGer the Suicide Act 1961, section 2(4). As such, 
the interference caused by the prohibition on encouraging or assisting suicide with the right to respect for 
SULYDWHOLIHSURWHFWHGE\DUWLFOHRIWKH(&+5ZDVQRWµLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHODZ¶20 The decision in R 
(Purdy) v DPP was made possible by the ruling of the ECHR in Pretty v United Kingdom that the right to 
decide how and when to die is an aspect of the right to private life protected by article 8 of the ECHR.21 
Unsuccessful challenges to the law on assisted death have followed.22±24 More litigation on the issue of 
whether the criminal prohibition on assisted death is compatible with article 8 of the ECHR is highly likely. 
In parallel to activity in the courts, the campaign organization Dignity in Dying is spearheading ongoing 
attempts to legalize a version of the Oregon model for physician-assisted suicide through Parliament (see, 
for example, the Assisted Dying (No. 2) Bill 2015-16 and the Assisted Dying Bill [HL] 2015-16). Box 4.5 
provides a worked example in respect of suicide assistance. 
Box 4.5 Suicide assistance. 
A 75-year-old man had locally advanced prostate cancer treated by radiotherapy and hormone therapy. He 
obtained a useful remission of his disease with good quality of life. Unfortunately, 18 months later the 
disease in the pelvis progressed, resulting in extensive bone metastases producing painful fractures. He 
was treated with intravenous chemotherapy and targeted therapy, with very little benefit. He received 
radiotherapy to painful bone lesions that reduced his pain considerably for several months. 
During the period of reasonable symptom control, the patient decided in view of his age, his frailty and his 
social situation that he wished to travel to a Switzerland where he could lawfully perform suicide with the 
assistance of an organization that provides this service. 
He asks his clinical team if they would prepare a report documenting his case and explaining his clinical 
status that could be provided to the organization in the jurisdiction in which assisted suicide is lawful. He 
had no family or friends and he asked the clinical team if they would assist him in booking ambulance-
assisted air travel to the other country to receive assistance to die. 
Are the clinical team permitted to prepare a report for him to help him make his arrangements? 
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The clinical team are entitled to refuse to write a medical report for the patient, because of the risk of 
exposure to criminal liability. The provision of a report is an act capable of encouraging or assisting 
suicide or attempted suicide. If the report is intended to encourage or assist suicide, the issue of criminal 
liability will arise. Writing a medical report for the patient also runs the risk of professional regulatory 
fitness-to-practise proceedings.25,26 
A patient may request a copy of his medical records, which the clinical team are under a legal obligation 
to provide. Paragraph 22 of the General Medical Council (GMC) guidance states that compliance with a 
GDWDVXEMHFWDFFHVVUHTXHVWZLOOµQRWQRUPDOO\JLYHULVHWRDTXHVWLRQRILPSDLUHGILWQHVVWRSUDFWLVH¶.25 
6RPHDFWLRQVUHODWHGWRDSHUVRQ¶VGHFLVLRQWRRUDELOLW\WRFRPPLWVXLFLGHDUHODZIXORUZLOOEHWRR
GLVWDQWIURPWKHHQFRXUDJHPHQWRUDVVLVWDQFHWRUDLVHDTXHVWLRQDERXWDGRFWRU¶Vfitness to practise. These 
include, but are not limited to, µSURYLGLQJDFFHVVWRDSDWLHQW¶VUHFRUGVZKHUHDVXEMHFWDFFHVVUHTXHVWKDV
been made in accordance with the terms of the (Data Protection Act 2018, section 45)¶.25 
The GMC position can be explainHGE\µOHJDODGYLFHWRWKHHIIHFWWKDWDGRFWRU¶VFRPSOLDQFHZLWKD
subject access request even if they knew the reason for that request [was to seek assisted suicide] would 
be too far removed from the act of suicide to constitute encouragement or assistanFH¶27 This provides 
insight into the legality of complying with a request for medical records that a patient intends to use for 
the purposes of suicide assistance. Such conduct is unlikely to constitute an act capable of encouraging or 
assisting suicide; it falls outside the bounds of the Suicide Act 1961, section 2, offence. 
Are they permitted to help him book his flight with appropriate clinical and ambulance support? 
This conduct falls within the scope of the offence of encouraging or assisting suicide. The first stage of 
the two-stage test would likely be satisfied; that is, there would be sufficient evidence (such as 
correspondence regarding transit arrangements) to provide a realistic prospect of a conviction. In respect 
of the second, public interest, VWDJHWKHSDWLHQW¶VDSSDUHQWO\DXWRQRPRXVGHFLVLRQWRVHHNVXLFLGH
assistance abroad would be a factor tending against prosecution. However, the pre-existing duty of care 
between the clinical team and the patient would constitute a factor tending in favour of prosecution. Even 
if it were ultimately concluded that prosecution was not in the public interest, the mere fact of the duty of 
care will likely result in a police investigation into the conduct of the clinical team. 
 
3. :KDW¶VVROHJDOO\special about physician-assisted death? 
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Physician-assisted death, that is, physician-administered voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, 
is unlawful in England and Wales. In this section, I wish to interrogate the idea that, legally speaking, 
physician-assisted death is special compared with other medical interventions. I consider, through discussion 
of the medical exception (WKHOHJDOGRFWULQHWKDWµWDNHVPRVWPHGLFDOWUHDWPHQWRXWVLGH«criminal law 
UHJXODWLRQ¶28) what it is that might make physician-assisted death legally exceptional. 
I argue that in terms of patient benefit, the reasons a physician might provide assistance to die may be the 
same as the reasons she might offer other medical interventions. On this ground, physician-assisted death is 
not legally special. However, it is possible that physician-assisted death may be legally differentiated from 
other medical interventions on public interest grounds. It is these latter arguments that require careful 
specification and evaluation. If it is plausible that physician-assisted death falls within the medical 
exception, we have reason to think that it ought to be lawful. 
I should stress that what follows is a legal argument, as opposed to a moral argument. Of course, the 
separation between law and morality is not always neat, and the discussion touches on factors that might be 
thought relevant to the moral permissibility of physician-assisted death and assisted death more broadly. 
What is the medical exception? It is important to recognize that the criminal law is of universal application 
and is prima facie applicable to medical conduct. Medical interventions that involve bodily interference or 
conduct that causes injury would be crimes, often serious crimes, were it not for legal rules that exempt 
medicine from the criminal law (R v Brown, page 266).29 
A general principle of the criminal law is that consent alone makes bodily interference involving touching 
but amounting to less than actual bodily harm lawful.29 A physician does not commit a crime in touching her 
patient during a medical examination and treatment, because the latter has waived her inviolability through 
consent. If, during the course of medical intervention, a physician injures her patient (causes actual bodily 
harm or greater), consent alone does not provide a defence; the conduct is prima facie criminal, but the 
medical exception may render it lawful. Here, injury refers to any event that interferes with the health of the 
patient, even if she will be better off overall if treatment is successful. For example, injury may include 
tissue damage from injections or catheterization, wounds from surgical incision, or the main and side effects 
of chemotherapy. The medical exception makes these instances of injury-causing conduct lawful because 
there is a public interest in the practice of medicine. 
Penney Lewis observes three categories of public interest reasons that may explain why a particular 
intervention falls within the medical exception: (1) patient-focused ± the intervention is better for patients 
(by which is meant any potential class of patients); (2) public-focused ± the intervention is better for the 
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community (which might include its being better for patients), for example, tissue and organ donation and 
non-therapeutic research; (3) professionally focused ± the intervention accords with accepted medical 
practice.28 
I shall focus on the patient-focused and public-focused reasons. While professionally focused reasons may 
explain why an intervention falls within the medical exception, I am dubious as to whether appeals to 
accepted medical practice can, in and of themselves, justify or determine its legality. Any compelling appeal 
to why it is professionally appropriate to offer an intervention must surely rely on patient- or public-focused 
reasoning. Importantly for my purposes, physicians have no monopoly over what counts as patient or 
community benefit. We can employ these concepts to evaluate whether physician-assisted death ought to fall 
within the medical exception, and for what reason. 
In respect of patient benefit, the argument is that it is in the public interest for medical interventions that are 
better for patients to stand outside the criminal law (within the medical exception). Typically, the analysis of 
whether a procedure is better for patients involves a welfare-level comparison. Would an individual be better 
off in terms of her well-being were she to have the intervention compared with not having it? Implicit in this 
analysis is the patLHQW¶VFRQWLQXHGH[LVWHQFHUHJDUGOHVVRIZKHWKHUVKHUHFHLYHVWUHDWPHQW)RUH[DPSOHWKH
choice whether to have knee surgery may involve the option of surgery with the promise of greater mobility, 
and the option of reduced mobility without surgery. In the ordinary run of things, this decision involves 
choosing between states of affairs in which the patient is alive. 
It is intuitive that assisted death could be better for some individuals: for example, those who suffer and 
wish to die, whose suffering is grave and for whom death would be a proportionate response.30 However, the 
analysis of whether physician-assisted death falls within the medical exception cannot appeal to welfare-
level comparisons; that is, we cannot establish its betterness for patients by thinking comparatively about 
well-being in the usual way. This is because if an individual receives assistance to die, she will cease to 
exist; whereas, if she does not, she will, at least for a time, continue to exist. A welfare-level comparison in 
such circumstances is impossible: it involves comparing existence and non-existence, something and 
nothing. In order for physician-assisted death to fall within the medical exception, it is necessary to describe 
how it could be better for patients in a non-welfare-level comparison sense. This may be philosophically 
challenging.31 
Importantly, however, resort to non-welfare-level comparisons does not make physician-assisted death 
legally special. There are interventions whose situation within the medical exception can only be explained 
by appeal to non-welfare-level comparisons. This is the case for life-prolonging interventions as a class. For 
example, when considering whether surgical treatment for mortal (gunshot, knife, etc.) wounds is better for 
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patients, we must compare the option of surgery and (it is hoped) living, with the option of not having 
surgery and dying: we must compare the comparative value of existence and non-existence. Ordinarily, it is 
lawful to treat mortal wounds because it is better for patients, but the analysis of why it is better to have life-
prolonging treatment does not involve a comparison of welfare levels of a person who will exist regardless 
of whether they have treatment. In sum, the fact that physician-assisted death requires a non-welfare-level 
analysis of patient benefit cannot exclude it from falling within the medical exception; that is, if assisted 
death is better for patients, it may be lawful for the same reason that other medical interventions are lawful. 
According to the public-focused justification, interventions that are better for the community are in the 
public interest and fall within the medical exception. As noted above, this includes interventions whose 
benefit to the individual who undergoes the procedure is questionable, such as tissue and organ donation and 
non-therapeutic research. In addition, it is plausible that it is in the interest of the community that individuals 
receive interventions that are better for them. As such, the public-focused justification for the medical 
exception might be thought to include the patient-focused justification. There is, I would argue, an important 
qualification to this claim: an intervention that is better for patients cannot be worse for the community in 
terms oILWVLPSDFWRQLWVPHPEHUV¶ULJKWVRULQWHUHVWV)RUH[DPSOHLQWKH1RUWK&DUROLQDFDVHRIState v 
Bass, it was (arguably) better for the patient to have his hand anaesthetized (by a doctor) prior to amputation 
of four digits (by someone else) in order to commit insurance fraud, but it is clearly worse for the 
community to facilitate such crimes.32 This constraint on the compatibility of patient- and public-focused 
justifications for the medical exception potentially points to a basis for legal differentiation of physician-
assisted death from other medical interventions. 
While physician-assisted death may be better for patients, it might be thought to exert harmful effects on the 
community. The challenge for proponents of the legalization of assisted death who wish to bring physician-
assisted death within the medical exception is to show that it would not be the case, and the challenge for 
opponents of legalization is to show that it would be the case. 
The English courts have identified three principal arguments against the legalization of assisted death, none 
of which are settled. First, it might be thought that the legal permissibility of assisted death exposes certain 
populations, for example, individuals who might be exposed to pressure to seek assistance to die or 
socialized into thinking that their lives are not worth living, to the risk of harm, and that risk justifies 
disregarding the benefits of legalization for others.22,33 Second, it might be thought that the legalization of 
physician-assisted death would undermine trust between patients and doctors.23 Third, it might be thought 
that legalization of physician-assisted death expresses or communicates the view that human life under 
certain conditions may not be worth living, and that it is wrong for the law to express this sentiment (R 
(Nicklinson and Another) v Ministry of Justice, paragraphs 91 and 185)).22 
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I do not intend (and I lack the space) to resolve these arguments here. What is important to note is that none 
seem to be pressing issues in respect of currently lawful medical interventions ± though the second 
occasionally comes up in various forms in respect of organ transplantation.34 On the one hand, it is possible 
that physician-assisted death is legally special because of one or more of these grounds. This would mean 
that physician-assisted death would be incompatible with the public-focused justification for the medical 
exception and as such ought not to be lawful for the same reason that other medical interventions are lawful. 
On the other hand, if none of these arguments have merit, all things considered, physician-assisted death 
would not be legally special and there we would have a compelling reason to think that it ought to be lawful 
and treated like any other (lawful) medical procedure. It is necessary carefully to specify and to evaluate 
each of the worse-for-the-community-based objections to the legalization of physician-assisted death in 
order to establish the truth. 
4. Conclusion 
This contribution had two aims. First, I sought to provide an overview of the legal status of a variety of end 
of life decisions or interventions in England and Wales. Refusal of life-prolonging medical treatment, SED, 
and withdrawal or withholding of life-prolonging treatment are all lawful in this jurisdiction. Euthanasia and 
assisted suicide are both unlawful. Second, I explained what makes medicine lawful in England and Wales. I 
applied analysis of the medical exception ± the legal doctrine that exempts procedures involving injury to 
the patient from the criminal law ± to physician-assisted death. I argued that physician-assisted death may be 
better for patients in the same way as other medical interventions may be better for patients. I also outlined 
three potential arguments that physician-assisted death might be worse for the community and thus not able 
to fall within the medical exception: the risk of harm to others; trust in the medical profession; and the 
purported expression in law that some lives are not worth living. These arguments involve complex 
empirical or normative matters, but it behoves us to attempt to resolve them and establish whether assisted 
death has a place in medicine. 
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